acknowledged good faith as a general organising principle of contractual performance at common law. After a multi-jurisdictional survey, the court rejected English recalcitrance and, instead, concluded that recognising a good faith principle makes "the common law less unsettled and piecemeal, more coherent and just". 15 Bhasin's other remarkable contribution is to recognise, for the first time, a general duty of honesty in contractual performance which is derived from the good faith principle. This duty means, as the SCC explains, "simply that parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract". principle can make the law more coherent and responsive to real problems while also requiring appropriate safeguards against excessive judicial empowerment to be put in place.
Bhasin may provide inspiration here, although change in the Scottish courts' approach seems unlikely unless and until the English courts do so too.
B. CANADIAN LAW (1) Bhasin v Hrynew: An Overview
The plaintiff, Mr Bhasin, and the defendant, Canadian American Financial Corp (Can-Am)
were parties to a commercial dealership agreement whereby Bhasin's agency sold Can-Am's education savings plans to investors. The non-renewal clause provided that either party could terminate their contract on six months' notice upon expiry of the first three-year period.
When a Bhasin competitor, Mr Hrynew, joined Can-Am, he pressured Can-Am to force a merger with Bhasin. Can-Am complied, triggering its non-renewal clause by giving Bhasin proper notice of termination and then merging Bhasin's agency with Hrynew's. Bhasin sued, inter alia, for breach of contract. 18 Notwithstanding an entire agreement clause which would generally operate to prevent the court from implying terms in this case, 19 the trial judge implied a term that Can-Am could only trigger the non-renewal clause for good faith reasons. 20 Though recognising that implying such a term was contrary to the entire agreement clause at bar, the court ruled that the clause was of no effect since Can-Am had exercised its non-renewal power "unfairly or abusively", 21 Bhasin was not sophisticated, 22 and it would be unjust or inequitable to allow Can-Am to rely on the non-renewal clause as written. 23 The trial judge also went on to find that Can-Am had breached an implied term of good faith on various occasions, including when it acted dishonestly in not advising Bhasin that a merger 18 Bhasinv Hrynew, 2011 ABQB 637 at para 47, [2012] 9 WWR7 [Bhasin QB]. 19 The entire agreement clause was as follows: "This Agreement expresses the entire and final agreement between the parties hereto and supersedes all previous agreements between the parties. There are no representations, warranties, terms, conditions or collateral agreements, express, implied or statutory, other than expressly set out in this Agreement." See Bhasin QB at para 110. 20 Ibid at para 104. 21 Ibid at paras 117, 118. 22 Ibid at para 115. 23 Ibid at paras 117-118. See also paras 246-247. 7 decision had been taken 24 and "equivocated" in response to Bhasin's question as to whether a merger of the agencies would take place. 25 She awarded over $380,000 in damages for, inter alia, loss of income and business. 26 On appeal, the trial decision was reversed in its entirety. The court concluded that a good faith term could not be implied because it would conflict with an express term; violate the parol evidence rule; 27 and be contrary to the entire agreement clause. 28 On a related front, the lower court's determination that the contract could only be terminated for good faith reasons "flatly" contradicted the words of the non-renewal clause.
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On further appeal, the SCC found for Bhasin but on entirely new grounds. It identified, for the first time, the good faith principle informing contractual performance and explained how Can-Am was in breach of the new duty of honesty that underlies all contracts.
These matters are discussed in more detail below. The good faith principle does not, on its own, operate as a contractual term, implied or otherwise, or found any cause of action. 35 Rather, the principle is a standard, underpinning, uniting, and organising those aspects of contract law which, as described by the SCC, require "honest, candid, forthright or reasonable contractual performance". 36 For example, the good faith principle is the source of the long-standing doctrine of unconscionability because it expressly considers "the fairness of contractual bargains". 37 As another example, the good faith principle can be a basis for implying contractual terms that regulate the defendant's freedom of action.
38
The good faith principle has a twofold purpose. First, it is the source of and justification for certain existing contract rules or elements. 39 Second, it is the foundation for the judicial promulgation of new contract rules or elements, albeit on a cautious, restrained, incremental and precedent-respecting basis. 40 As a post-Bhasin court has observed, Bhasin is 34 Ibid at para 69. For reference to Sir George Leggatt, see ibid at para 57. 38 Bhasin SCC at para 44. 39 Ibid at para 33. 40 Ibid at para 66.
not to lead to "the creation from whole cloth" of contractual obligations "which the parties have not provided for or have addressed in a fashion which one party regrets in hindsight".
(3) Good Faith as Reasonableness
Though the line between honesty and reasonableness in the good faith principle is not airtight, neither are they synonyms. This is particularly so given that reasonableness incorporates the idea of honesty but not necessarily the other way around. Accordingly, sometimes contract rules or elements are emanations of the higher, reasonableness standard associated with the principle of good faith -such as the implication of contractual terms by operation of law, as discussed below. At other times, the emanation is from the lower, honesty standard associated with the principle of good faith. For example, when an employer terminates an employee's contract, Canadian law requires that the manner of dismissal -how the employee is treated at the time of discharge -meets a good faith standard, with honesty being a "key component" according to the SCC in Bhasin.
42
While the Bhasin decision is complex and its articulation of the good faith principle broad, manifestations of the principle are reasonably easy to pin down. In relation to reasonableness, the good faith principle largely denotes good faith as a contractual term.
More specifically, in certain kinds of contracts (unhelpfully described as "types of relationships" by the court), good faith is a term implied by operation of law. In these specific kinds of contracts, a good faith term is a legal incident recognised, not based on the parties' Bhasin emphasises that good faith claims will generally not succeed unless they fit with existing doctrine, 70 but does expressly instruct lower courts to develop, on rare occasions, the good faith principle incrementally "where existing law is found to be wanting". 71 If incremental change was the path that the appellate court was travelling, it really should have expressly identified itself as doing so. As it stands, the decision proceeds with no recognition of or accounting for its novelty. Even in a subsequent decision distinguishing Mohamed, the Court of Appeal does not explain itself. 70 Bhasin SCC at para 66. 71 Ibid.
The Court of Appeal in CM Callow Inc v Zollinger 2018 ONCA 896 judicially considered
Mohamed but tersely and without expansion, at para 20. 14 express contractual power; and how to approach the question of whether the good faith standard has been fulfilled or not.
Returning to Bhasin's assessment of when a good faith term should be implied under the reasonableness arm, the SCC invokes the influential lead of McCamus, who identifies three "situations" on this front:
(1) where the parties must cooperate in order to achieve the objects of the contract
[such as where the court implies a term that the vendor must take all reasonable steps to complete the subject sale, at para 49];
(2) where one party exercises a discretionary power under the contract [for example, in setting a price]; and (3) where one party seeks to evade contractual duties [as when a party relies on a contractual power to repudiate but based on circumstances he has himself created].
73
For example, the law in relation to situation (2) gives a nod to contractual intention 74 but essentially starts with a presumption that contractual discretions will be exercised reasonably, 75 honestly, and in good faith. 76 This judicial approach amounts to a much stronger affirmation of the good faith principle than the simple implication of terms discussed previously. In short, courts will implicitly recognise 77 a reasonableness standard in the discretion clause absent explicit language to the contrary or "a clear indication from the tenor of the contract or the nature of the subject matter". 78 The presumption in these cases tilts strongly towards good faith by requiring the other side to dislodge it and by permitting judicial review of how the contractual discretion is exercised. Greenberg on this point. 76 Greenberg at 764. 77 McCamus, Contract (n 37) 849.
78 Greenberg at 762.
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Corporation, 79 was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a bonus when he had not met the express vesting conditions specified in the contract. The trial judge ruled in his favour, concluding that the employer had a discretion to award the bonus or not and furthermore, that such a discretion had to be exercised in good faith. 80 A majority of the Court of Appeal reversed on several grounds, including because the subject contract did not actually even contain a discretion clause. As the majority stated, while it is true that one party (here, the employer) can decide against insisting on the strict written terms of a contract (that is, award a bonus even though it has not vested), such a waiver "is not 'discretion' in performance granted by the contract". 81 The court continued:
'Giving up rights' is not properly described as a 'discretion', much less one that can be reviewed by the court; the court cannot require one party to give up its contractual rights under the guise of regulating the exercise of a discretion: Bhasin at para 73.
82
The majority went on to rule that the contract "left no doubt" 83 that the plaintiff was ineligible for a bonus, adding that "Bhasin does not permit the respondent to simply ignore that provision in the contract because he wishes, with hindsight, that he had made a different bargain".
84
The trial level decision in Styles mentioned above is one that would cause concern to good faith sceptics. This is because, inter alia, the trial judge disregarded an express term in favour of holding the defendant to a good faith standard. More specifically, the trial judge held that the defendant had a discretion to award the plaintiff an unvested bonus but recognised that the entire agreement clause would otherwise prevent her from importing a good faith obligation. 85 As a work-around, the trial judge relied on Bhasin's statement that, 81 Styles CA at para 29. 82 Ibid.
83 Styles CA at para 6.
84 Styles CA at para 64. See Bhasin SCC at para 72 for discussion of what counts as a discretion.
85 Styles QB at para 55. 16 albeit rarely, the "application of the organising principle of good faith to particular situations should be developed where the existing law is found to be wanting." 86 The trial judge then proceeded to find a new duty which apparently requires good faith in the exercise of contractual discretion (as an emanation of the Bhasin principle), 87 which duty cannot be excluded by an entire agreement clause. 88 In short, the court went well beyond the discretion cases recognised by Bhasin -which functionally regards good faith as presumption which can be disclaimed -to casting a new duty of good faith in the exercise of discretionary powers that cannot be.
On appeal, this innovation was thoroughly rejected for being inconsistent with
Bhasin. According to the appellate court: "Bhasin is not to be used as a tool to rewrite contracts, and award damages to contracting parties that the court regards as being 'fair', even though they are clearly unearned under the contract." 89 It should be emphasised, though, that the appellate court was not challenging the discretion cases recognised in Bhasin but the trial judge's radical expansion of those cases from one identifying good faith as default standard to one which apparently posits good faith an invariable and mandatory one.
Like Mohamed discussed earlier, it would seem that the trial judge was intent on assisting a party whom she regarded as meritorious but unfairly shut out of a bonus by the strict terms of the contract.
(4) Good Faith as Honesty
This section turns briefly to the honesty arm of the good faith principle and in particular, the SCC's recognition of the new duty of honesty which informs all contracts. As previously noted, this duty is a "simple requirement not to lie or mislead the other party about one's contractual performance". 90 Bhasin's rationale for such a duty is as follows:
Commercial parties reasonably expect a basic level of honesty and good faith in contractual dealings. While they remain at arm's length and are not subject to the 86 Ibid para 62, quoting Oracle which was quoting Bhasin SCC. 87 Ibid at 63. 88 Ibid at para 64.
89 Styles CA at para 54.
90 Bhasin SCC at para 73.
duties of a fiduciary, a basic level of honest conduct is necessary to the proper functioning of commerce.….
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While breach of the duty of honesty is independently actionable, the court insists that it is not an implied contractual term 92 nor is it a tort, for that matter. Rather, the duty of honesty is a hybrid on several fronts. Looking at it from the perspective of contract law, the duty of honesty is like the doctrine of unconscionability because it inures in all contracts 93 and cannot be broadly disclaimed. 94 Yet it is like a term because its violation is subject to a contractual measure of damages, not the rescissionary remedy associated with unconscionability. 95 From the perspective of tort law, the duty of honesty is like the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation (as the court readily acknowledges 96 ) since it ordinarily involves a false statement; but it is distinct because, in the SCC's words, it does not require that the defendant "intend that the false statement be relied on, and breach of it supports a claim for damages according to the contractual rather than the tortious measure". 97 Entire agreement clauses would not generally impact on the duty because, like unconscionability, it cannot be excluded. 98 However, parties are entitled to "relax the requirements of the doctrine so long as they respect its minimum core requirements".
99
The creation of a duty of honesty was indispensable to Bhasin's win before the SCC. This is because the defendant's decision to terminate could not itself be successfully impeached. In short, the SCC ruled that the contract gave the defendant an unfettered power to end the contract on notice; an entire agreement clause apparently meant that there could be 91 Ibid at para 60. Where courts have found a breach of a good faith duty to negotiate, the defendant's conduct has been seriously deficient and functionally dishonest. A common feature of the caselaw -whether pre or post-Bhasin -involves obvious stonewalling by the defendant as so to terminate the parties' contractual relationship based. 108 Bargaining with no intention of reaching an agreement is a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith.
109
Bhasin's recognition of a duty of honesty seems both helpful and harmless. At least in abstraction, it is helpful in identifying a rock bottom standard of contractual performance, while being harmless since the duty seems to cover much the same terrain as civil fraud would in any event. 110 It is also helpful to hold accountable those who negotiate dishonestly in the context of an enforceable duty to the contrary. This is because the innocent party has paid for a benefit (an option to renew, for example) and is being shammed out of it.
However, the duty of honesty is also problematic since it apparently covers more than fraud or lying. This is because the SCC seemed to impeach Can Am for also having 113 Ibid. 114 The reference here is to the ancient armorial bearings of the City of Glasgow: the bird that never flew, the tree that never grew, the bell that never rang, and the fish that never swam.
But "never" turned out to be wrong in all four instances thanks to Glasgow's founder and A contract is a co-operative enterprise, entered into by parties for their mutual benefit.
It is intended to achieve objectives that are common to both parties; … a contract should normally be construed in such a way as to avoid arbitrary or unpredictable burdens or impositions, and conversely arbitrary or unpredictable benefits, in the nature of windfalls; to do otherwise would frustrate one of the most elementary commercial objectives.
131
But this passage, and the outcome of the case, were heavily criticised, 132 and subsequently the First Division said this of Lord Drummond Young's dictum:
[T]he general observations in Grove Investments ought not, we consider, to be taken as indicating that the considerations of co-operation and mutuality that would be appropriate to, say, partnership or joint venture apply across the board. Commercial contracts may, equally, be hard fought with each party intent on securing their own particular objective. As senior counsel for the respondents accepted in the course of discussion, parties enter into contracts for their respective benefit.
(2) Defining good faith in Scotland
Given all this, there is unsurprisingly little attempt in either Scottish cases or juristic writing to define good faith in performance, whether in terms of honesty or reasonableness or any other quality. The only specifically Scottish attempt of which we are aware is by Hogg:
The duty to act honestly and openly in one's dealings with the other party, which includes (but is not limited to) not seeking to take undue advantage of the other party, 130 See e.g. In a subsequent careful review of the relevant authorities (English as well as Scots),
Hogg concludes (consistently with Bhasin) that good faith so defined is not a basis by itself for implying terms in fact into contracts. While good faith may be implied as a substantive obligation especially in long-term (or relational) contracts, the implication remains dependent on the traditional tests of "necessity" and "business efficacy". 135 There is accordingly no general implication of good faith as a matter of law, as distinct from in the facts and circumstances of particular cases. Since the article was written, a commercial judge, Lady
Wolffe, has addressed an argument that an obligation of good faith could be implied in a particular contract financing a property development, but declined to offer an opinion on the general question, on the basis that the term proposed in the particular case (i.e. a term to be implied in fact) would anyway fail the tests of "necessity" or "obviousness".
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On the other hand, the doctrine of terms implied in law includes some which may be implied in contracts generally and which look very like aspects of good faith. Thus parties may be compelled to co-operate to ensure that the contract is carried out, to perform within a reasonable time, to exercise discretionary powers under the contract reasonably, and not to prevent another party from performing or to do anything else to derogate from the contract. are increasingly subject to implied considerations of good faith. 139 That argument left open, however, the question of how far such implicit restraints might be overcome by express contractual provision. In Glasgow West Housing Association Ltd v Siddique the view was taken that, while an expressly "absolute" discretion could not be overcome by the implication of terms, it might still be possible to challenge its non-or "wholly unreasonable" exercise.
But the legal basis for such a challenge would not be an implied term, albeit no alternative was specified by the court. 140 In and certain "know your customer (KYC)" information to the vendor, who was entitled at its "sole discretion" to deem the deposit not paid and so to treat the contract as repudiated by the purchaser if the KYC information was not received by a certain date. The purchaser provided the requested KYC information on time, but the material, when coupled with a late request that the sale be made to a nominee of the purchaser, raised suspicions in the vendor about a possible money-laundering dimension to the transaction, and it requested further information about the purchaser's source of wealth but without setting any specific deadline for its submission. In reply the purchaser's solicitors appeared to prevaricate; and the vendor then purported to terminate the contract. But the purchaser intimated a wish to continue, and the vendor provided a further opportunity for the supply of information, this time with a sevenday deadline. The vendor was again dis-satisfied with the information supplied, and once more declared the contract at an end. The purchaser sought implement of the contract.
Reversing the commercial judge at first instance, the First Division held that the minor issues with the initially submitted KYC information probably did not entitle the vendor to treat the contract as repudiated but that it was legitimate under the contract for it to request further information. Giving the second opportunity to provide further information was also legitimate. However, the court held, in language redolent of good faith, that the vendor was not entitled to rescind the bargain suddenly and without warning only three days later.
Doing so without warning and on the stated basis, which concerned only the absence of the source of funds information, amounted to an unlawful repudiation of the contract. 
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The purchaser's consequent entitlement to implement of the contract was however still subject to his providing the KYC information reasonably required by the vendor and paying the price.
Three other rules of Scots contract law associated with breach of contract can also be taken as relating to contractual performance and yet enforcement is subject to "equitable" considerations which might be (but presently are not) presented as aspects of good faith in contractual performance: (1) the right to claim specific implement (performance) of a contract's non-monetary obligations; 146 (2) anticipatory or anticipated breach (where if a party refuses to perform a contract, or gives notice that it will not perform when the time comes, the other party is not bound to terminate but may instead elect to continue performance on its side of the bargain and claim payment therefor); 147 and (3) mutuality of contract (where a party is entitled to exercise the self-help remedy of mutuality retention by with-holding or suspending performance due under the contract until the other party cures or remedies its breach of reciprocal obligations under the contract). 148 In each case there are equitable controls upon the innocent party's right to claim the other's performance and its freedom to perform or not to perform, as the case may be. Here, we will focus most on (2) and (3), merely noting in passing that in each there may be something to be learned from the equitable constraints on specific implement, which include the court's consideration of the order's practicability, exceptional hardship for the defender, and the reasonable availability to the pursuer of alternative sources of supply.
149
In the anticipated breach case the innocent party's freedom to perform is said to be constrained by two considerations: that its ability to do so is not dependent upon the other party's active co-operation, and that the innocent party has a "legitimate interest" in continuing to perform. 150 These constraints have been less deployed in Scotland than in 146 McBryde, Contract (n 116) ch 23. 
29
England, 151 where the judicial consensus appears to be that a commercial party always has a legitimate interest in performing the contract except in cases of absolute unreasonableness.
152
It is therefore difficult to see either consideration as currently active requirements of good faith in performance. Matters would be different, however, if, as one recent commentator has suggested, the innocent party had to demonstrate its legitimate interest in performance rather than have it assumed. 153 But in 2018 the Scottish Law Commission decided not to recommend reform in this area to prevent unreasonable conduct by the innocent party, instead encouraging the Scottish courts to give greater consideration to the "co-operation" and "legitimate interest" constraints. 154 A consideration relevant to good faith might be whether the court would grant the second party an order for specific implement against the first party, especially if alternative sources of supply were reasonably available to the former.
More judicial attention has been given recently, however, to the explicitly equitable analysis of one aspect of the topic. 155 He highlighted a line of authority under which the court has an equitable power to allow a party to withhold payment of a debt otherwise fixed in amount and presently payable (i.e. "liquid") on the basis of a claim not so fixed or due (i.e.
"illiquid", e.g. a damages claim) but shortly to be decided by the court, in order for set-offor, in the traditional language of Scots law, compensation-to extinguish the two debts to the amount of whichever is the lesser. This rule has been dubbed "special retention", to contrast it with the withholding/suspending nature of "mutuality" retention. The crucial point of distinction is that while the withholding or suspension of performance in mutuality retention tends to look to the eventual performance of the contract (or a substitute therefor), special retention is a step on the road to the extinction of its obligations by compensation. This tempers the strictness of the still-extant Compensation Act 1592, by which extinctive compensation takes place only between two liquid claims (although not necessarily arising from the same source of obligation). The court must be satisfied, however, that allowing special retention is equitable. non-refundable payments. The ultimate aim was a private residential development, and if sales were arranged by the developers the owners had an obligation to convey the land to the purchasers. The parties also provided for a security to be granted in favour of the developers, covering sums to be paid to the latter in the event of their being able to organise these sales.
The development never took place, and the owners terminated the agreement by valid notice.
But the developers refused to discharge the security and counterclaimed for losses suffered as a result of alleged breaches by the owners. The First Division held that the refusal was not a valid exercise of the remedy of retention, which could not be used to compel performance of reciprocal obligations which were no longer extant by virtue of the contract's valid termination. 159 The principal other ground for refusal was that the obligations in question were clearly not reciprocal under the contract, so that one could not be withheld in respect of any failure on the other side. But the First Division, with Lord Drummond Young again stressing the need to prevent abuse of the power to retain, also highlighted the inequity of allowing the remedy when the developers' allegations of breach against the owners were vague and non-specific and when they had available to them another remedy (diligence on the dependence) by which the owners' power to deal with the land could be restricted until satisfaction of the claims against them. 160 This last smacks somewhat, however, of the muchcriticised approach in the law of unjustified enrichment whereby the equitable remedy cannot be exercised where another exists at law. 161 Like claims in unjustified enrichment, mutuality retention is a matter of right, not equity, and the court's power is only one to regulate abuse of that right. The mere existence of another, different right capable of having an equivalent effect should not matter in that question. Additional light is thrown on the equitable control of retention by the equitable control of the closely related right of lien, "a real right to retain property until the discharge of an obligation or certain obligations, the property not having been delivered to the retaining party for the purpose of security." 164 The classic example in the contractual context is where the creditor gains possession of the debtor's property in order to carry out work upon it, such as repair, and is not paid for that work. The equitable control of lien consists in the court's capacity to prevent abuse and unfair oppression of the contract-breaker. 165 Examples from the case law include that party's need to have the property back for some other pressing reason, such as completing a tax return or for business requirements, and its re-delivery to that party only upon the latter finding other security (such as consigning in court the amount said to be due)
for payment or performance of the disputed obligation. 166 The control is thus not one of In this and related ways, therefore, Bhasin poses no danger because it articulates a light version of a good faith principle, having regard for common law traditions going to respect for private orderings and concern that courts be not given the means to "veer" into "ad hoc judicial moralism". 173 The SCC was certainly aware of the perils traditionally associated by Common (and many Scots) lawyers with over-arching notions of good faith in contract, and put control mechanisms in place to guard against them. Accordingly, and unlike civil law jurisdictions, the good faith principle does not have an overriding influence on the content of a contract. With the exception of the uncontroversial new duty of honesty, the contract's content is established as it always has been -according to doctrines regarding implied terms (as illustrated in the context of contractual discretions).
174
Good faith was also carefully defined by the SCC to distinguish it from fiduciary obligations and avoid any suggestion that it entailed putting another party's interests ahead of one's own. The implications of the good faith principle are also highly context-specific, varying from case to case according to facts and circumstances, including in relation to the express and implied provisions of the contract in question.
As a result of the limits and confines placed on the good faith principle by the SCC, its potential adoption in Scotland would offer more opportunity than risk. Jeannie Paterson is right to say that explicit recognition of a good faith principle is unnecessary where there is already recognition of more specific obligations such as loyalty or fidelity to the contractual relationship, primarily by requiring honesty and cooperation in contract performance and by precluding the exercise of discretionary contractual powers in a manner that is unreasonable or outside the proper purposes of the power. 175 Scots law certainly already does accept these more specific duties, albeit in a somewhat subdued manner. 176 However, there is also something to be said for more general statements. Third, the good faith principle helps put certain judicial lines of authority on more solid ground, thereby contributing to legal certainty. Thus, the SCC's endorsement of the new duty of honesty makes the duty to negotiate in good faith (derived from an existing contract) much more accepted and uncontroversial. Such an effect might be attractive and indeed desirable in Scotland, given increasing use of "good faith" clauses in commercial contracts despite the judicial doubts expressed thereon. It might even assist in validating the controversial group of cases establishing non-contractual liability in certain circumstances for unjustifiable or unreasonable breaking off negotiations for a contract, rather than leaving them in an uncertain and doubtful limbo. 178 Again, a focus on the specific context in such cases would help identify those circumstances (probably exceptional) in which such liability could arise, while its subjection to contrary contract terms could avoid any uncertainty for Setting aside whether the courts in Scotland might consider adopting a good faith principle, Bhasin seems to us nonetheless immediately helpful in advancing the discussion of good faith within the UK generally. Its emphasis on the continuing primacy of the contract and the variability of the standard of good faith and the duty of honesty according to context is more useful than consideration of the extent to which a contract is or is not "relational",
given the debate around that concept. The "relationality" of a contract will undoubtedly be important context in finding that the parties' relationship is one justifying implicit requirements of open-ness, co-operation, and concern for each other's position. 186 But, as
Hugh Collins points out, in first proposing relational contract theory Ian Macneil did not intend to make a conceptual distinction with legal effects: rather, "he argued that the context of an exchange matters for an understanding of all contracts, because they are normally embedded in prior social relations". 187 Similarly, the position between parties negotiating a 180 Percy (n 177) at 231. 186 Bhasin SCC acknowledges that the general organising principle of good faith "would likely have different implications in the context of a long-term contract of mutual cooperation than it would in a more transactional exchange" (para 69).
187 Collins (n 13), 45. But all that said, the good faith principle can be emboldening and even ignite the judicial imagination such that advance word from the UKSC may not be required. The growing need to interpret the good faith clauses that commercial practitioners continue to insist on putting into the contracts they draft may have its own, independent effect. Perhaps like the bird that it was thought would never fly, the Scottish courts under the stimulus of Bhasin and commercial usage will yet come to life and recognise the potential of the good faith principle as a way to doing their work better. 
